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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CHRISTOPHER JONES, : Case No. 20010872-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JONES' CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF $ 76-5-
406.50 YhHS NOT MOOT. 
The State does not address the merits of Appellant Christopher Jones' ("Jones") 
challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1 )(h) (1999) 
(acceptance into a residential treatment center) ("probation statute"). Rather, it merely 
asserts that the issue is moot, contending that Jones is disqualified under subsection (l)(f) 
of the probation statute (offense not committed in the presence of another person). See 
State's Brief ("SB") at p.7-8. 
The State's argument is without merit. First, Jones has not had a proper hearing 
conducted in accord with due process for the purpose of determining his eligibility under 
the other factors set forth in § 76-5-406.5(1). See Appellant's Brief ("AB") Point B. The 
only hearing held concerned the constitutionality of subsection (l)(h) as applied to Jones' 
case. R.418. In fact, the prosecutor had the same understanding of the purpose of the 
hearing as Jones, to wit, that the hearing was only to decide the constitutionality of 
subsection (l)(h). R.418[ 17]. In that vein, the prosecutor stated to the court, *'[t]he 
defendant has indicated that he canft get into Fremont, because AP&P has made certain 
findings. It seems to me that the way to overcome those findings is to have a court 
hearing..." Id. Since the hearing was limited in scope to that issue, no other evidence or 
witnesses were presented on any of the other eligibility criteria of the probation statute. 
R.418. Nonetheless, the trial court made a finding that Jones was disqualified under 
subsection (l)(f) notwithstanding the constitutional challenge. R.418[21]. 
Although the trial court made this finding, it is not a sound one for purposes of the 
Statefs mootness argument. Since sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, 
due process requires that a punishment meted out by the court must be based on reliable 
and accurate information. See State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994); see also 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In order to ensure reliability and 
accuracy, all parties must be able to examine and challenge the evidence. Id 
Yet, Jones did not have the opportunity to present any evidence concerning his 
eligibility under subsection (l)(f) at the hearing on the constitutionality of subsection 
(l)(h). See generally R.418. The State did not present any evidence as to that issue 
either. R.418[ 16-19]. In fact, the only comment made by the State regarding Jones' 
eligibility under subsection (l)(f) was to illustrate the need for a hearing on the eligibility 
criteria. R.418[17]. Without the presentation of the requisite reliable and accurate 
information, the trial court could not and did not make a competent decision regarding 
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his eligibility. See Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854. 
Since the trial court did not make a sound decision regarding his eligibility under 
subsection (l)(f), the State's allegation of mootness is without merit. Rather, this Court 
should address the constitutionality of subsection (l)(h) since it is critical to a resolution 
of Jones' appeal. See Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). Indeed, it is the 
preliminary and "essential" question that must be addressed before a hearing on the 
eligibility factors can be held. Id. 
II. JONES HAS A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A HEARING ON THE 
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA. 
The State concedes that Jones requested to be sentenced under the probation 
statute. See SB 10. The State also concedes that "every criminal defendant convicted of 
attempted sodomy upon a child who invokes this statute has a due process right to 
present evidence showing that he meets the statute's twelve qualifications." IdL (citing 
Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855; State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993)). 
Nonetheless, the State contends that Jones' is not entitled to his due process rights 
at sentencing. See SB 10-14. It reasons that the trial court found Jones' ineligible under 
subsection (l)(f), which renders the need for an eligibility hearing on the other factors 
moot since a judge is obliged to deny a defendant probation if he does not meet all the 
criteria of the probation statute. The State also suggests that Jones1 waived his right to a 
sentencing hearing, contending that Jones admitted to the court that he would be 
ineligible for probation if the trial court ruled against him on his constitutional challenge 
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to subsection (l)(h). 
As noted supra Point I, the trial court did not make a competent finding regarding 
subsection (l)(f) since no evidence at all was presented on that point at the hearing on the 
constitutionality of subsection (l)(h). Hence, contrary to the State's position, a hearing is 
necessary to get all the accurate and reliable evidence before the court so that it can make 
a competent decision as to (l)(f) and the rest of the eligibility criteria. 
Moreover, the State's waiver argument is meritless. The State cites defense 
counsel out of context. Defense counsel was attempting to explain to the court why he 
was not waiving his right to a hearing when he stated, "I didn't feel like it was a 
productive use of this Court's time to go through (a) through (k) minus (h), and then at 
the end say we can't do (h). That didn't make a lot of judicial sense. Instead, I felt the 
better, more appropriate way was to acknowledge the shortcomings, acknowledge that 
we didn't have (h), and ask the Court to consider a challenge to the constitutional 
application of it." R.418[78]. 
Hence, so long as an issue as to the constitutionality of subsection (h) remains on 
appeal, there is no waiver of the right to the hearing. In fact, Jones expressly stated on 
the record that he did not waive an evidentiary hearing on the eligibility factors and that 
the trial court incorrectly interpreted that he had. R.418[ 13-14]. He further contested the 
trial court's conclusion about waiving the hearing when he refused to approve the court's 
written findings and conclusions as to form and withholding his signature from them. 
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R.413. The record similarly lacks any evidence of a formal waiver, either written or 
through a colloquy between the judge and Jones. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why 
any defendant in Jones' position would waive a sentencing hearing when it might mean 
the difference between incarceration and placement in a residential treatment center, a far 
better option. 
Where the evidence of the alleged waiver is ambiguous if not lacking altogether, 
waiver cannot be presumed. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ f 55,463 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 5; State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^  70. As noted by this Court, "every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of [Jones'] fundamental constitutional rights [at 
sentencing must be indulged absent] convincing evidence that such rights were waived." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at Tf55. 
In light of the foregoing, Jones' statement is merely an explanation of the 
procedural tack he took to address this discreet constitutional issue and not a waiver of 
the hearing. Indeed, there is still an argument to be made under subsection (l)(h), even if 
Jones does not prevail on the constitutional challenge. He can still contest AP&P's 
conclusion, cross-examine the person who prepared the AP&P report, and present Dr. 
Ririe on his own behalf as well as other witnesses who can attest to his suitability for an 
in-patient residential treatment program. Although this task would be made easier if he 
prevailed on the constitutional issue, it is by no means impossible if not. Consequently, 
where critical sentencing issues remain, a hearing is required by due process. See 
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Gomez. 887 P.2d at 854. 
As a final matter, the State presumes that this Court will affirm the trial court 
regarding subsection (l)(h) and therefore seeks as a remedy only vacation of the court's 
findings on the other eligibility factors if this Court finds them erroneous. See SB 14. 
As noted above, a hearing will still be required under subsection (l)(h) even if Jones' 
does not prevail on the constitutional challenge so that he will have the opportunity to 
contest AP&P's recommendation regarding placement in a residential abuse treatment 
center. Consequently, the State's proposed remedy is not adequate under the 
circumstances. 
III. THE STATE'S INVITED ERROR CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
The State, in a footnote, suggests that Jones' appeal, at least as far as the court's 
findings regarding subsection (l)(f), should not be addressed under the invited error 
doctrine. See SB n. 1. The State contends that Jones lulled the court into making this 
finding when he stated that there was some evidence that could support an ineligibility 
finding it if the court chose to believe it. IcL.; see also R.418[15]. 
The State's argument is without merit because Jones' comment was not a 
concession as to ineligibility under (l)(f). Rather, Jones made the statement to illustrate 
that there was a dispute on that issue; while the court may believe the State's allegation 
that there a third person present when the offense occurred, Jones himself intended to 
dispute such evidence at a sentencing hearing. R.418[15]. Considering Jones' position 
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during the entire hearing, emphasizing that he did not waive a sentencing hearing 
regarding eligibility under the probation statute, the State's invited error claim is 
untenable. See supra Point II. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and for the reasons set forth in his opening brief, Jones 
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand his case tot the trial 
court for a sentencing hearing as required by due process and § 76-5-406.5. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30& day of January, 2003. 
U * ^ * * 9 . I Ah. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY ( J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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